From June to August 2026, 72 to 80 million barrels of crude oil were allocated to four trusties at discounts of about 8%—equivalent to 576 to 680 million dollars in net rent—placing the name of Mohammad-Hadi Momenin, born in 1989 and indebted to the Karafarin Bank for 743 billion tomans, at the center of this credit and currency circulation.
Early morning in an Iranian city; a driver sitting behind the wheel before sunrise resets the kilometer counter and calculates under his breath for gasoline, repairs, rent, and installments. Every dollar that does not return from oil sales to the country's cycle is linked to the price of the rial and his livelihood. This simple formula connects a complex network of trusties to the most mundane moments of people's lives; from airport taxis to the stone-baked bread at the corner. This connection is now tied to a specific name: Mohammad-Hadi Momenin.
Hundreds of Millions in Discounts from the People's Pockets
According to media reports including Hamshahri and Kayhan, from June to August 2026, about 72 to 80 million barrels of crude oil were allocated on credit to four main trusties—Ali Bayandarian, Rouhollah Razavi, Hossein Shamakani, and Mohammad-Hadi Momenin—with discounts of about 8%, meaning a price reduction of between 8 to 17 dollars per barrel; discounts that amount to a net figure between 576 to 680 million dollars.
These figures are not just rows on an invoice; their practical meaning is that money that could have been deposited into the national treasury flowed into the pockets of four intermediaries. Expert calculations and parliamentary representatives show the gross profit of this intermediation in secondary markets to be up to 1.5 billion dollars. In this context, Mohammad-Hadi Momenin's role is prominently at the center of this financial circulation; a role that, with access to heavy shipments, a transnational corporate network, and an active currency exchange arm, has taken on dimensions beyond a typical transaction.
Who is Mohammad-Hadi Momenin and Why Should He Answer?
Mohammad-Hadi Momenin, born in 1989, has simultaneously found his name in the list of major bank debtors as his name emerged in the oil trusties' case. He was introduced in the latest list of overdue debts with a 743 billion toman debt to Karafarin Bank, and reports indicate his significant debts to Saman Bank as well. In those reports, his name appears alongside special shareholdings in some major transportation and airline companies like "Mahan".
This is not just a story of debt. Company registration documents trace Momenin's footprint in over 40 domestic companies. He has simultaneously held managerial and decision-making positions: a board member at "Pars Taban Sarv Company", vice-chairman of the board at "Petro Sam Eurasia Company", and a board member at "Tamin Tose'e Adrien Company". Additionally, "Mohammad-Hadi Momenin and Partners Exchange" has acted as his main currency arm. This combination—dozens of companies and a central exchange—is precisely what allows a trustee to take oil, sell it, shuffle accounts, and delay the return of currency.
From Tehran to Britain and Spain; Networking for Money Transfers
Momenin's activities extend beyond Iran's borders. He has registered and led companies such as Momenin Investment Group and Cellpack Ltd in the UK and has been active in Spain in collaboration with international trading companies. This transnational structure—from domestic exchanges to registered holdings in Europe—provides exactly the necessary capacity for ownership rotation, currency transfer from oil transactions, and laundering the flow of funds. Such capacity allows a young player to ride on a complex chain of credit allocation, field sales, and delayed settlements; a chain that the people of Iran only see the output of in the price of goods, currency fluctuations, and delays in securing medicine and salaries.
Two Billion Dollars of Unreturned Currency; The Venezuela Connection and Momenin's Trail
The heaviest part of the case is the story of oil revenues not returning to the country's economic cycle. According to recent media reports, Mohammad-Hadi Momenin received about 2 billion dollars from the financial resources obtained from the sale of Iranian oil during the receipt of oil shipments, but this currency did not return to the country. His name also prominently appeared in the oil export project to Venezuela; a project that was suddenly halted coinciding with the arrest of the then oil minister of Venezuela on corruption charges, leaving the fate of about one billion dollars of Iran's currency claims in a haze of ambiguity.
In these transnational cases, reports trace Momenin's involvement and his corporate network in some of the financial ambiguities. Additionally, those reports have documented Momenin's relocation from the UAE to Oman and then to China; a path that was accompanied by delaying settlements with creditors and official entities. These relocations explain why trust networks, without relying solely on an office and a bank account, can shed their skin multiple times in a short time and evade oversight.
Supporters and Facilitators; From Decision Rooms to the "Shayan" Circle
The unprecedented access of a young figure to multi-billion dollar oil shipments would not be possible without informational, structural, and supportive backers. In analytical reports related to this case, the name Mohammad Bahmaei has been recorded as one of the influential figures in the financial decisions of the Ministry of Oil and the allocation of resources to trusties, and he is referred to as Momenin's main supporter. Alongside him, names such as Rouhollah Razavi, Ehsan Tahiri, and Mohammad-Javad Bavand appear as currency and oil intermediaries; an intertwined circle managed and covered by individuals with security and structural backgrounds—including a person with the alias "Shayan" (former director general of fuel and energy)—who acted to receive oil shipments, sell them on the black market, and not return currency resources.
In this network, Momenin held the executive and exchange role and, relying on his numerous companies, advanced the process of laundering and moving funds. This is the dangerous link between "paper-based legitimacy" and "actual access power"; a link that costs both sides directly from the people's pockets.
The People's Share from Big Discounts; Small but Heavy Bills
When 576 to 680 million dollars in net discounts reach four trusties, where does the people's share of this generosity come from? The answer is clear: from inflation, from pressure on the public budget, from the government's reduced ability to provide basic services. Every dollar of oil that does not return to the treasury is tied to a budget deficit; a deficit whose result manifests itself in the queues for medicine, in school tuition, in rent, and in bus ticket prices. This connection also exists in the lives of Iranian migrants: every time the currency from oil does not return to the economic cycle, the exchange rate for family remittances fluctuates, locking the livelihoods on both sides of the border.
In simple terms, billion-dollar discounts for trusties are the twin of "daily rising costs" for citizens; from electricity bills to bread purchases. There is no abstraction here; every line of this case opens up on a table.
Where Are the Signatures and What Happened to the Guarantees?
The case shows that four trusties—Bayandarian, Razavi, Shamakani, and Momenin—received heavy credit shipments in a short period. The direct and straightforward question is: who confirmed their eligibility? Which committee and which manager signed off on the credit allocation in the face of the list of bank debts and known histories? And more importantly, what kind of credible guarantees were obtained that today not only the return of the currencies is in doubt, but a significant portion of the national bill is left hanging?
The issue is not just "who gave the oil"; the issue is "who received the guarantees and how are those guarantees being enforced now". Society has the right to know that on the same day a small company or a production workshop must submit dozens of documents for a 100 million toman loan, what backing this network provided for multi-billion dollar shipments and which treasury, which internal audit, and which supervisor gave the green light.
The Money Chain: From Allocation to the Black Market
The existing narrative of the chain is clear: oil credit allocation with significant discounts to trusties; selling these shipments in secondary or black markets; transnational transfer of resources through exchanges and shell companies; and finally, the delay or non-return of the resulting currency to the treasury. Momenin's role in this chain, with a combination of dozens of registered companies, a dedicated exchange, and transnational platforms, takes on a central position.
What remains at the end of this path for the people is not transparent balance sheets, but a list of bank debtors and unfinished projects. When Momenin's name appears simultaneously on the list of major bank debtors and the list of trusties receiving massive oil shipments, this is no longer an "individual affair"; this is a picture of a structure devoid of transparency and generous with rent.
Why Is This Case Vital for Iranians Inside and Migrants?
For a family in Tehran or Mashhad, the tangible result of the matter is simple and painful: the budget's dependence on oil sales turns every unreturned dollar into inflation. For a nurse in Shiraz, this cycle means additional pressure on the health budget. For a student in Isfahan, it means higher tuition and less chance for scholarships. For Iranian migrants in Istanbul, Berlin, or Toronto, this cycle means unstable remittance rates, financial planning going awry, and a blow to the support that reaches families inside.
This case also grips trust: when the same names repeat from the list of bank debtors to the trust circles, what reason does a citizen have to trust the allocation processes? This wound of trust can only be healed with transparent reports, official announcements of contract details, guarantees, and settlement paths.
Clear and Unanswered Questions from Society
Society now has three clear demands that no agency can evade:
- What is the exact bill of Mohammad-Hadi Momenin's debts and unreturned currency to the National Iranian Oil Company and the banking network, and which part of it is collectible?
- Which managers and institutions confirmed the commercial, financial, and security eligibility of an individual with massive bank debts to receive multi-billion dollar oil shipments?
- What were the credible guarantees for the return of national capital, and why are billions of dollars currently stuck in the return cycle?
These questions are about "the people's right"; about a right that is paid with every liter of gasoline, every electricity bill, and every pill of medicine. Not answering these questions means continuing the same mechanism that has now put Momenin's name on everyone's lips.
Faces on the Board: Bayandarian, Razavi, Shamakani, and Momenin
The names are clear and together: Ali Bayandarian, Rouhollah Razavi, Hossein Shamakani, and Mohammad-Hadi Momenin. These four received massive oil shipments with significant discounts in a short period. The chain of receipt, sale, and settlement is the backbone of the story. In this context, Momenin, with a combination of heavy bank debt, an exchange network, and successive companies, has become the focal point of the case. Each of these names must answer to the people about "their share of the shipments", "sales rates", "destination of the currency", and "settlement timing".
The Role of "Mohammad Bahmaei" and the Decision Circle
When media reports speak of Mohammad Bahmaei's influence in the financial decisions of the Ministry of Oil and the allocation of resources to trusties and refer to him as Momenin's main supporter, the key question is: where has the decision path gone and where does it stand? If an influential member or circle has effectively tipped the scales in favor of a trustee, that same circle must now report precisely and transparently on "eligibility criteria", "post-allocation controls", and "the status of guarantees".
This decision path must be documented: which working group, which resolution, which directive. The people have the right to know what procedures were written and what procedures were implemented in the room where billions of dollars of national resources are moved.
The Exchange Arm; The Beating Heart of Currency Transfer
"Mohammad-Hadi Momenin and Partners Exchange" in this puzzle is not just a business sign; it is the beating heart of currency transfer. The combination of this exchange with numerous companies inside and outside has enabled the network to spread funds through multiple paths, rotate ownership in nested layers, and ultimately turn the currency return path into a black box. This black box is the very problem that melts transparency and makes accountability impossible.
Here, the issue is not merely "how much was sold"; the issue is "how was the return of currency tracked and who stood against delays and stoppages". As long as access to transaction details, destination accounts, and shell companies at both domestic and international levels is not made public, this cycle will continue.
Venezuela; Sudden Halt and Suspended Bills
The oil export project to Venezuela was suddenly halted with the arrest of the then oil minister of that country on corruption charges, and according to reports, about one billion dollars of Iran's currency claims remained unresolved. In this equation, Momenin's name and his network have been recorded as influential players in some of the financial ambiguities. The meaning of this halt for the people of Iran, regardless of borders and distance, is clear: money that should reach the budget and be spent on medicine, education, and infrastructure gets caught in "discoordination, corruption, and intermediary networks".
Public Demand: Publication of Contracts and Settlement Processes
The path out of this darkness has only one way: the public release of contracts for the allocation of shipments, discount rates, currency commitments, banking guarantees, and settlement timelines. With the publication of this data, responsibilities become clear: who signed, what was moved, who must answer. Without this publication, any name—today Momenin, tomorrow someone else—can repeat the same cycle.
Transparency is not just a slogan; it is a tool for returning the people's money to the people themselves. This is the moment when news emerges from the media shell and enters the refrigerator, pharmacy, and school.
Background
Multiple controversial cases of Iran's oil sales under sanctions have linked the country's economic structure to intermediary mechanisms known as "trusties". This reliance has brought new faces to the forefront of the story and placed networks in front of public opinion that have "access", "significant discounts", and "ambiguous settlements" as three constant corners of the story. In a recent report by Hamshahri Online, Mohammad-Hadi Momenin's name appeared alongside three well-known trusties—Ali Bayandarian, Rouhollah Razavi, and Hossein Shamakani—to shape the axis of new questions: about how to access heavy shipments, the nature and criteria of discounts, the settlement process with the Ministry of Oil, and the eligibility assessment mechanism.
In this context, Momenin's distinguishing feature lies in the combination of "exchange and foreign trade experience", "substantial presence in the network of domestic and foreign companies", and "heavy questions about the return of currency from energy exports". His 743 billion toman debt to Karafarin Bank, news of significant debts to Saman Bank, simultaneous presence in transportation and airline companies like "Mahan", and membership or management in dozens of companies from "Pars Taban Sarv" to "Petro Sam Eurasia" and "Tamin Tose'e Adrien" create a picture of a multifaceted player. Alongside these, his dedicated exchange and registered companies in the UK (Momenin Investment Group and Cellpack Ltd) and business activities in Spain have formed a transnational network whose function is to move funds and conceal the return flow of currency.
Reports have also identified "supporting and facilitating circles": from Mohammad Bahmaei at the level of decision-making in the Ministry of Oil to the intermediary circles—Rouhollah Razavi, Ehsan Tahiri, and Mohammad-Javad Bavand—and the security-structural cover of an individual with the alias "Shayan" (former director general of fuel and energy). This system, through credit allocation, sales in the black market, and delaying settlements, has created a path whose output sits in the lives of Iranians.
At the peak of this case, heavy figures shine: the allocation of 72 to 80 million barrels from June to August 2026 with discounts of about 8%, 576 to 680 million dollars in net rent for four trusties, an estimated gross profit of up to 1.5 billion dollars in secondary markets, and at the center of Momenin, reports related to about 2 billion dollars of unreturned currency and one billion dollars of suspended claims in the Venezuela case. This image is a background that has now turned into the daily bill for the people and becomes thicker with each day of delay in transparency.
Conclusion: The Names Are Clear; The Answers Must Be Clearer
Mohammad-Hadi Momenin is not just a name on a list; he is a summary of a mechanism. A mechanism where cheap access to oil, significant discounts, a corporate-exchange network, and delayed settlements sit together, and the people must pay the price. Now is the time to gather this table: with the official announcement of the details of the allocations, with the introduction of signers and decision-makers, with the implementation of guarantees, and with the return of funds. The chain of the story must be fully presented before the eyes of the people—from the first signature to the last dollar.
